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 ABSTRACT 
 
We analyze the effect of applied research institutions on regional innovation activity. 
Exploiting a policy reform that creates tertiary education institutions conducting applied 
research, the Universities of Applied Sciences (UASs) in Switzerland, we apply difference-in-
differences estimations to investigate the effect on innovation quantity and quality. Findings 
show a 7.7 to 13 percent increase in regional patenting activity (i.e., quantity), and a 1.3 to 11 
percent increase in patent family size, and the number of granted patents, claims, and citations 
per patent (i.e., quality). Findings are robust to various model specifications, suggesting that 
applied research taught in UASs boosts regional innovation. 
 
1 
I. Introduction 
Following Jaffe’s (1989) influential study on “the real effects of academic research,” a study 
investigating the innovation effects of research in universities, a number of researchers have 
investigated the role played by major centers of academic research and education, such as those 
in Silicon Valley or on Route 128, in enhancing a country’s innovation activities (e.g., Audretsch 
& Stephan, 1996; Mansfield & Lee; 1996, Saxenian, 2000). More recently, some studies have 
also successfully resolved endogeneity problems and identified causal effects (e.g., Toivanen & 
Väänanen, 2016; Valero & Van Reenen, 2016).  
However, two issues remain unresolved: First, the literature has mainly examined the effect on 
innovation of universities that predominantly focus on basic research (e.g., Rosenberg & Nelson, 
1994). Institutions that conduct and teach applied research have not been studied. Second, 
regional heterogeneity in innovation activities can be very substantial. Thus what works for the 
major innovation centers, which often draw upon many top-ranked academic research 
institutions, might not work for other regions of a state or country. Whether the implementation 
of applied education institutions can drive innovation activities in regions outside of major 
centers of commercial innovation remains unknown. But given their focus on applied research 
and the strong relationships they have to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), such a link 
appears plausible.  
This paper directly tackles these two issues by investigating the effect of the establishment of 
applied research institutions on regional innovation activities. To do so, we exploit an educational 
policy intervention in Switzerland in the mid-1990s, the establishment of Universities of Applied 
Sciences (UASs1). According to their legal mandate, UASs must (a) focus their research and 
																																								 																				
1 “Universities of Applied Sciences” is used for Swiss institutions called “Fachhochschulen” or for German 
institutions called “Fachhochschulen” and more recently “Hochschulen für angewandte Wissenschaften (HAW)”. 
2 
teaching on applying scientific methods and knowledge, (b) collaborate with firms when 
conducting their research, and (c) collaborate with other research-oriented institutions, including 
both academic universities and other UASs. Because UASs were created and funded to both 
conduct and teach applied research, their establishment allows us to estimate the effects of 
applied research on innovation activities.  
We study the effect of the establishment of UASs and the supply shock in applied research 
that it generated on regional innovation activities by using a difference-in-differences (DiD) 
approach which allows us to compare treated regions (with newly established UASs) with 
untreated regions (with no UASs). Identification using DiD requires both the treated and the 
untreated regions to have parallel trends before the UAS establishment took place: We investigate 
this assumption and find strong empirical support for it. To determine whether a region is treated 
or untreated, we first discuss the possible mechanisms through which a UAS affects the region’s 
innovation activities. Second, using the distance and travel time from each municipality to the 
closest UAS, we define the geographical area in which these mechanisms are likely to appear. 
To measure innovation effects, we use patent information which provides us with 
comprehensive information on the emergence of new technologies, and because patent data are 
systematically screened and recorded by patent offices (Nagaoka, Motohashi, & Goto, 2010; 
Giuri et al., 2007). From administrative records of the European Patent Office (EPO) we obtain 
data on the location of each applicant to determine the geographic origin of patent applications. 
From these data we compute the number of regional patent applications, grants and citations per 
year. 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																				
We use the abbreviation UASs for Universities of Applied Sciences, plural, and UAS for University of Applied 
Sciences, singular. 
3 
However, not all patents are equally important: some are more valuable, others are less so (van 
Zeerbroeck, 2011). EPO patent filings are already more valuable than national ones, but are still 
highly heterogeneous in terms of value. The economic value of patents thus greatly differs (Acs 
et al., 2002; Giuri et al., 2007; Griliches, 1979, 2007). Estimating the effect of the establishment 
of UASs on patent quality therefore requires further measures that take into account the value 
distribution of patents. For our second outcome measure of “regional patenting quality,” we use 
the following quality indicators provided by the EPO: grant status, forward citations, claims, and 
patent family size. 
Our empirical results show an increase in the quantity and the quality of innovation activities 
after the establishment of UASs: Depending on the specification of our econometric model, we 
estimate an increase of 7.7 to 13 percent in regional patenting activity. Depending on the quality 
indicator we use, we measure an increase of 1.2 to 11 percent in regional patenting quality. 
Several robustness tests verify that the impact on innovation is highly robust. In the last section, 
we provide additional empirical analyses of the mechanisms that might underlie the increased 
innovation activities. Our results indicate that the effects are at least partly due to a change in the 
labor supply, i.e., UAS graduates who spread out into the treated regions after the UASs were 
established.  
For national or regional innovation policy makers, our results suggest that the establishment of 
applied research and higher education institutions helps to foster regional innovation by 
spreading innovation activities to areas outside the major innovation centers, often through more 
traditional and small or medium-sized firms. The UASs intensify applied research and innovation 
in these enterprises by providing graduates who combine thorough vocational knowledge 
(acquired through mandatory pre-UAS apprenticeships) with applied research skills.  
4 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II presents the institutional 
background and outlines the Swiss education system. Section III explains how we created and 
prepared the data. Section IV describes our empirical strategy, and section V shows the results. 
Section VI provides number of robustness checks, and section VII discusses the findings and 
concludes. 
 
II. Institutional Background 
Before the UAS reform and the resulting UAS establishment in the 1990s, the higher 
education system in Switzerland was essentially built upon two pillars: (a) 10 cantonal2 and two 
federal universities that together served approximately 10 percent of the country’s population, 
and (b) professional vocational education and training (PVET) institutions for approximately 15 
percent of the population.3 This situation changed structurally with the establishment of UASs, as 
a result of a policy reform aimed at revitalizing and strengthening the Swiss economy.4 The 
Swiss federal government’s decision to establish UASs throughout the country aimed at 
																																								 																				
2 Switzerland comprises 26 cantons, which are similar to U.S. states (see  
http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/regionen/11/geo/institutionelle_gliederungen/01b.html). 
3 The Swiss education system has both an academic and a vocational track at the upper secondary and tertiary 
levels. However, the large majority of Swiss students follow the vocational track completing an apprenticeship and 
receiving a nationally recognized certificate that gives them access to vocational institutions at the tertiary level: 
UASs, Professional Education and Training Colleges, and (Advanced) Federal Professional Education and Training 
Exams (e.g., SCCRE 2007, 2010, and 2014). The latter two institutions allow vocational graduates to acquire formal, 
continuous training, but do not have a legal mandate to conduct research (Bereuter, 2011; EFHK, 2000). 
4 For further information about the reform and its implementation, see Botschaft FHSG (1994), Botschaft HFKG 
(2009), OPET (2009), Bundesgesetz Fachhochschulen 1995, Bundesgesetz HFKG 2011, EFHK (2000, 2002), Kiener 
(2013), Projektgruppe Bund-Kantone Hochschullandschaft 2008 (2004), or Weber and Tremel (2010). 
5 
providing apprenticeship graduates from the dual vocational education and training system (VET) 
with an academic career perspective by offering them an opportunity to earn a three-year 
bachelor’s degree in addition to their apprenticeship degree. 
To support innovation by UASs, educational policy makers gave UASs a legal mandate which 
required them to conduct and teach applied R&D and to provide related services to, and 
collaborate with, public or private sector firms (or both). The underlying idea was that UASs 
should provide a steady supply of highly skilled individuals with both practical and scientific 
knowledge, thereby fostering the direct transfer of knowledge and technology between the 
research institutions and public or private sector firms that could profit from that knowledge and 
technology (see SBFI, 2015, or Botschaft FHSG, 1994).  
In terms of research, UASs are legally required to adhere to the practical needs of Swiss firms 
and to focus on applied research and development projects and public services. UAS teaching 
therefore combines practical expertise, theoretical skills, and R&D-related experience. In 
contrast, academic universities perform basic academic research, provide academic training, and 
are expected to compete internationally in terms of scientific output. Their curricula concentrate 
on theory and abstract conceptual knowledge (see, e.g., Kiener, 2013, Projektgruppe Bund-
Kantone Hochschullandschaft 2008, 2004, or Botschaft FHSG, 1994). 
Although fields of study may overlap between universities and UASs—e.g., engineering, 
business administration, and chemistry—and graduates may end up in almost the same 
occupations and jobs, their educational careers differ substantially. While students in Swiss 
academic universities come directly from college preparatory high schools (known as 
“Gymnasium” or Baccalaureate schools), UAS students usually come from a dual VET system 
apprenticeship, which involves both classroom education and practical training, including work 
experience at the training firm. In addition, while students from both the academic university and 
6 
the UAS track may study in the same field (e.g., engineering), the academic group focuses on the 
abstract and theoretical aspects of the subject, whereas the UAS group focuses on the application 
of theoretical knowledge to the more short-term needs of firms and markets. Therefore, the 
second group often collaborates with local firms, including small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs). The reform thus added a new type of higher education institution, with a clear focus on 
conducting and teaching applied research, to the traditional university sector, which maintained 
its basic academic research and general scientific training. 
To estimate the effect of the UAS reform on innovation quantity and quality, we exploit two 
sources of variation in the establishment of UAS campuses: location and time. These two sources 
developed as a result of the Swiss political system. The federal government—the political 
authority that decides on whether to confer accreditation—did more than simply require the 
fulfillment of core characteristics (the legal mandates of teaching, services, collaboration, and 
applied R&D). It also restricted the maximum number of UASs, required a regional distribution 
that gave apprenticeship-trained individuals equal access to UASs throughout Switzerland, and 
consolidated existing (and new) UAS campuses to ensure a sufficiently large size and solid 
financial base.  
These federal location decisions provoked heated political discussions among cantons—the 
political unit that carried the main financial burden of the UASs—about the location of UASs and 
their campuses. In addition, the requirements for consolidating UAS campuses and programs led 
to political trench warfare between—and even within—cantons. The restrictions and the resulting 
debate thus led not only to the establishment of new campuses and the relocation and closing 
down of old ones, but also to time delays in the establishment of some UASs. Given that this 
development was highly driven by political factors, the decision of where and when a UAS 
campus was to be established was hardly foreseeable and remained open until the very end of the 
7 
process—and was therefore not likely related to already existing innovation activities. Thus the 
timing and location of UAS campuses appear related more to political factors and all kinds of 
coalition building rather than to underlying differences in economic, technical, or innovative 
factors.5 
 
 
III. Data 
A. Definition of Treatment and Control Groups 
The establishment of the UASs was staggered, with the first campuses opening in 1997 and 
the last in 2003.6 For our analysis, we use the establishment of all UAS campuses with programs 
in engineering, IT, chemistry, and the life sciences, because these particular fields are the most 
likely to have an effect on innovation as measured by patents. Moreover, these fields have been 
used in previous studies on similar topics (e.g., Toivanen & Väänänen, 2016; Schartinger, 
Rammer, Fischer, & Fröhlich, 2002). We restrict our analysis to campuses located in the 
German-speaking part of Switzerland, which has a long tradition in training apprentices and, 
therefore, the highest share of individuals following the vocational track.7 The German-speaking 
																																								 																				
5 Pfister (mimeo 2017) provides a detailed analysis of the process through which the establishment of UASs was 
determined. Results are available upon request. 
6 Similar to the University of California system, which comprises over 10 university campuses such as Berkeley 
in the north and UCLA in the south, the Swiss UAS’s also constitute a system of campuses spread throughout 
different regions of Switzerland. We reconstruct the history of all UAS and their campuses and focus on these 
campuses, as the federal government accredited each UAS campus individually. 
7 Language and culture among the German-speaking part of Switzerland (i.e., the Northeast of Switzerland) and 
the Latin parts of Switzerland (i.e., the French-speaking part in the West, the Italian-speaking part in the South, and 
the Romansh-speaking part in the East) differ substantially (Eugster et al., 2011). So does the distribution of firms 
8 
UASs constitute two-thirds of the UAS in Switzerland. Figure 1 shows the 15 UAS campuses 
that were newly established between 1997 and 2003. Table 1 provides an overview of the 
locations and their years of establishment.  
 
Table 1 The UASs, the location of their campuses, and the year of establishment  
University of Applied Sciences Location of Campuses Year of establishment 
Bern University of Applied 
Sciences 
Bern 1997-2003 
Burgdorf 1997 
Biel 1997 
University of Applied Sciences of 
Eastern Switzerland 
St. Gallen 2000 
Rapperswil 2001 
Buchs 2001 
Chur 2000 
University of Applied Sciences of 
Zurich 
Winterthur 1998 
Wädenswil 1998 
Zürich 1998 
University of Applied Sciences of 
Central Switzerland Horw 1997 
University of Applied Sciences of 
Northwestern Switzerland 
Oensingen 1998-2003 
Olten 2003-2006 
Brugg-Windisch 1998 
Muttenz 1997 
Source: Authors' illustration, based on Botschaft FHSG (1994), Bundesgesetz Fachhochschulen (1995), EFHK 
(2000, 2002), Kiener (2013), articles from local newspapers, and interim reports. 
 
Our definition of whether a municipality was treated or untreated by the UAS reform builds on 
a commonly accepted finding in innovation and urban economics: Knowledge spillovers and 
innovation are spatially concentrated and geographically localized (Feldman & Kogler, 2010; 
Moretti, 2011). A sizable and growing literature stream within these fields investigates the role of 
universities in generating and fostering such regional innovation clusters (Bonander et al., 2016; 
Drucker & Goldstein, 2007; Liu, 2015). This literature suggests that universities affect regional 
innovation (and other economic outcomes such as productivity, growth, and entrepreneurial 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																				
that train apprentices (Backes-Gellner et al., 2017). We therefore focus on the German-speaking part of Switzerland, 
in which vocational education has much stronger roots. 
9 
activity) not only by producing (basic) research, but also by generating direct and indirect 
spillovers (Liu 2015). Direct spillovers result from the interaction between universities and firms, 
and from graduates entering the local labor market, remaining in it, and enhancing its quality. 
Indirect spillovers arise from agglomeration economies, i.e., the benefits or increasing returns 
accruing from nearby resources, such as firms or skilled people (Feldman & Audretsch 1999; 
Glaeser, 2010). 
Both types of spillovers are sensitive to geographical distance, because proximity implies 
lower costs (Feldman & Kogler, 2010; Moretti, 2011). Moreover, tacit knowledge—a 
fundamental driver of these spillovers—is regionally embedded (Feldman & Kogler, 2010; 
Lundvall & Johnson, 1994; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999). Given the non-codifiable nature of tacit 
knowledge, its transfer therefore requires “face-to-face exchange, routines, habits and norms, 
conventions of communication and interaction” (Feldman & Kogler 2010: 389).8 This sensitivity 
to distance implies that the effects of a UAS campus on the economy should be geographically 
restricted. We are therefore able to identify this local effect by defining the area of influence of a 
UAS campus, its catchment area. 
To define this UAS catchment area, we focus on the first form of direct spillovers, UAS 
graduates—highly skilled individuals who enter a labor market, remain in it, and improve its 
quality. These graduate are likely to enhance the quality of supply in the labor market because 
they possess a new type of human capital that includes vocational and academic education, and 
that particularly focuses on applied research and development and on the transfer of scientific 
																																								 																				
8 Carlino et al. (2007) review, amongst others, the studies by Andersson, Burgess, and Lane (2007), Anselin, 
Varga, and Acs (1997), Audretsch and Feldman (1996), Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993), and Rosenthal and 
Strange (2001), and conclude that spillovers are highly localized, i.e., at the zip code level or within metropolitan 
areas. 
10 
knowledge into practice. Assuming that these UAS graduates have a low mobility  (i.e. rarely 
moving or going for very long commutes), we are able to localize their effect on regional 
innovation. Such stable mobility behavior involves two factors: (a) potential UAS students 
studying at a UAS campus nearby and (b) UAS graduates staying in the area in which they 
completed their studies. In Section VI (Robustness Checks) which analyzes the question of 
potential contamination due to different forms of mobility of UAS graduates, we show that UAS 
graduates exhibit very low levels of mobility after graduation. The assumption of limited 
mobility is therefore very plausible.9 
The low mobility of UAS graduates allows us to measure the local effect of a UAS campus. 
To limit the area in which such a local effect appears, we focus on the distance between the place 
where UAS graduates live and the place where they work. In other words, in line with previous 
regional studies10, we define the optimal size of a UAS catchment area by focusing on the 
commuting patterns of individuals living in Switzerland: travel distance, travel time, and typical 
commuting behavior. The city in which the campus is located thereby constitutes the center of the 
																																								 																				
9The large majority of UAS graduates continue living in the same area where they graduated five years earlier 
(see 2.6 Robustness Checks in Pfister (mimeo 2017). The moving behavior of potential UAS students is likely to be 
even lower, as previous regional studies using Swiss data show that young adults exhibit a very low level of mobility 
(e.g., Muehlemann, Ryan & Wolter, 2013; Muehlemann & Wolter, 2011). Thus contamination due to potential UAS 
students’ moving from the control group to the treatment group is very unlikely. 
10 For Switzerland, Muehlemannn, Ryan and Wolter (2013) and Muehlemann and Wolter (2011) specify local 
labor markets by using commuting information. They argue that political borders are inappropriate for defining a 
region of economic activity in Switzerland because cantons—the largest political level—are too small. In addition, 
given Switzerland’s numerous mountains and lakes, calculating travel distances using coordinates is misleading. 
They therefore calculate travel times using automobile route guidance systems from the 67 largest Swiss cities and 
towns to the surrounding municipalities. Their travel limit, which relies on Swiss census information from 2000, 
equals 30 minutes. 
11 
catchment area.11 The appropriate distance from the UAS campus to the border of the catchment 
area is based on empirical evidence of commuting patterns from the mobility and transport 
microcensus (SFSO/ARE, 2007) of those individuals living in that area: This representative 
survey shows the typical commuting behavior in 2005: almost 90 percent of employed 
individuals living in Switzerland commute less than 25 kilometers (approximately 15 miles) from 
home to work.12  
We therefore define a municipality as a “treated region” if it is located within 25 kilometers of 
a UAS campus.13 Because a linear distance measure may be distorted by the unique Swiss 
topography, we use the actual travel distance as measured by geo-statistical data (SFSO, 
GEOSTAT 2007).14 This data provides information on the actual travel distance (in car 
																																								 																				
11 Section VI, Robustness Checks, also analyzes the potential contamination due to UAS graduates commuting 
not to the center of the catchment area but to another direction. The results show that such contamination does not 
affect our results. 
12 The low mobility of Swiss citizens may surprise US observers, but can be demonstrated using various data 
sources. Swiss youth in vocational training seek initial jobs close to their parental homes. Moreover, the locations of 
their UAS and their employers after graduation are in close regional proximity. To arrive at 25 km for our treatment 
definition, we use a representative survey that concentrates on the end of our observation period because commuting 
behavior increased between 1990 and 2008: In 1990, 96 percent of employed individuals living in Switzerland had a 
commute of 25 kilometers or less, and 94 percent a commute of 45 minutes or less (SFSO 1997). 
13 If a municipality is located within two UAS catchment areas, it is classified according the closest UAS campus. 
14 The mobility and transport microcensus (SFSO/ARE, 2007) shows that 90 percent of employed individuals 
have a commute of 45 minutes or less. To test the robustness of our measure, we use “travel time,” which we 
calculate using the respective Google application programming interface. We thus follow Belenzon and 
Schankerman (2013), who used Google Maps to calculate their geographic distance measures. The results Pfister 
(mimeo 2017) show that our definition of the UAS catchment area well represents the region in which 90 percent of 
Swiss people regularly commute. 
12 
kilometers) rather than the linear distance between all Swiss municipalities. Figure 1 shows the 
catchment area for the UAS campus in St. Gallen as an example. 
 
Figure 1 Catchment area for the campus in St. Gallen and locations of UAS campuses 
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on Grenzen 2016, SFSO GEOSTAT / swisstopo and on 
SFSO GEOSTAT, 2007. 
 
This definition of the UAS catchment area means that we compare the treatment group—the 
“treated regions” consisting of all municipalities within a 25-kilometer radius around a UAS 
campus—with the control group, the “untreated regions” (i.e., all other regions). Given that we 
rely on empirical evidence of commuting behavior, we measure the effect of the first form of 
direct spillovers explained in this section: highly skilled UAS graduates entering the labor 
market, remaining in it, and enhancing its quality. 
This definition of the UAS catchment area might also measure the second form of direct 
spillovers (interaction between UASs and firms) and indirect spillovers (agglomeration 
13 
economies), because these forms of spillovers appear locally (Liu 2015). However, disentangling 
the different spillovers beyond the scope of this study. For example, whether interaction between 
UASs and firms are sensitive to distance remains unclear. As the exploitation rights of inventions 
generated by such interaction are not regulated, collaboration between UASs and firms does not 
appear in the patent database.15 Consequently, calculating the distance between UASs and firms 
is not possible. 
Nevertheless, we try to investigate these different spillovers separately: In section VI, 
Robustness Checks, we focus on UAS graduates entering the labor market and show that a large 
part of the innovation effect is related to these graduates. However, a substantial percentage of 
the innovation effect remains unexplained and is therefore not attributable to this type of direct 
spillovers. Therefore, collaboration between UASs and firms, and agglomeration economies 
might constitute further important spillovers of UASs. 
 
B. Patent Data 
To measure patenting activity, we use patent data from the “Worldwide Patent Statistical 
Database – April 2013 Version” from the European Patent Office (EPO). The EPO database, 
containing more than one million patent applications of Swiss applicants from 1888 through 
2013, provides information about the application date and the inventors’ and applicants’ names, 
affiliations, and addresses. To localize a patent’s geographic origin, we use the applicant’s 
address. We assign each patent application to its applicant’s municipality, Switzerland’s smallest 
																																								 																				
15 UAS’s might not appear in the patent database as a firm’s collaboration partner because many of them do not 
pursue a patent portfolio strategy. Thus, while academic universities and federal institutes of technology never assign 
the complete intellectual property rights to the cooperating firm, a large percentage of UAS do (Hotz-Hart, 2010). 
14 
political unit.16 Because almost 99 percent of all patent applications have only one applicant, they 
can be clearly attributed to one specific municipality. For the remaining one percent with multiple 
applicants from several municipalities, we use fractional counts, i.e., we weight the number of 
applicants in a particular municipality by its relative number of applicants. 
To construct our outcome variable “regional patenting activity,” we take the sum of patent 
applications by application year and by treated vs untreated regions. We choose 1990 as our first 
year of observation, because the creation of the UASs started in 1997, and we want to ensure a 
sufficiently long pre-treatment period for testing the common trends assumption. We end our 
observation period in 2008 because in that year some UASs started to introduce Master’s level 
programs, possibly causing additional effects on patenting activity and the potential for 
systematic biases across UASs. Our final sample contains information on more than 300,000 
patent applications in 1435 regions of which 1043 were treated at some point.	
To create our outcome measures for “regional patenting quality,” we use the following set of 
quality indicators (provided by the European Patent Office) that indicate different aspects of 
value (e.g., Squicciarini et al., 2013): granted patents, forward citations, number of claims, and 
patent family size.17  
																																								 																				
16 Switzerland comprises approximately 2,300 municipalities, 148 districts, and 26 cantons (which are similar to 
U.S. states) (see 
http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/regionen/11/geo/institutionelle_gliederungen/01b.html). Each 
municipality generally includes several ZIP codes. Overall, Switzerland has about 3,500 ZIP codes. 
17 We link the indicators using the application identifier number appln_id from our database “Worldwide Patent 
Statistical Database – April 2013 Version.”  
As granted patents fulfill the patentability criteria (inventive step, novelty, and industrial applicability), they are 
technologically and economically more valuable than unsuccessful applications. However, as a large percentage of 
applications are granted, the indicator is less informative (OECD, 2009; van Zeebroeck, 2011). Forward Citations 
15 
The EPO database contains a binary variable indicating whether a patent application was 
granted. This variable consists of our qualitative indicator granted patents. The indicator forward 
citations includes the number of citations for each patent application. We use a five-year citation 
lag and alternatively a three-year lag between the application date of the cited patent and the 
application date of the citing patent.18  
To create the indicator number of claims, we use the number of claims in each patent 
application in the latest EP publication. Finally, the indicator patent family size refers to a 
variable that indicates the number of jurisdictions in which applications were filed to protect the 
invention. As foreign patent filings are relatively expensive due to translations, office fees and 
patent attorney costs, the latter variable reflects the applicant’s assessment of the patent’s value. 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																				
refer to the number of citations a patent receives in later patents. The literature provides empirical evidence that the 
more a patent is cited, the more valuable it is for the owner (higher private economic value for the patent holder) 
(e.g., Hall et al. 2005; Harhoff et al. 1999), and for those not holding the patent (higher social value) (Trajtenberg, 
1990). However, although the number of forward citations is correlated with the economic value of a patent, the 
relationship is noisy (Harhoff et al., 1999). Empirical evidence shows that patent value positively correlates with the 
number of claims in a patent application. For valuable inventions, patent attorneys will attempt to have patent 
protection on multiple aspects of the inventions, which is reflected in a larger number of claims (e.g., Lanjouw & 
Schankerman, 2004). Finally, we consider patent family size, i.e., the number of countries in which the applicant 
seeks protection for the invention (Harhoff et al, 2003; Lanjouw & Shankerman 2001; Schmoch, Grupp, Mannsbart 
& Schwitalla, 1988). 
18 One problem with using forward citations is its timeliness: As the citations that a patent receives appear over 
time, the indicator is censored to the right. Limiting the citation lag to a specific number of years solves the problem 
of timeliness (OECD, 2009). Most studies usually use a lag of five year, as more than 50% of citations arise within 
this years (Gambardella et al., 2008; Lanjouw & Schankerman, 2004; OECD, 2009; van Zeebroeck, 2011).  
16 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the regional patent quantity and quality measures for 
our treated and untreated regions before and after the establishment of UASs in absolute 
numbers, and Table 3 provides the respective trends. 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics for quantity and quality indicators20 
    Untreated regions     Treated regions 
       
      
 
Variable Mean SD Min. Max    Mean SD Min. Max 
Before the 
UAS 
establishment 
Number of Patent Applications 2.09 13.60 0.00 270.50    7.74 99.02 0.00 4102.32 
Number of Granted Patents 0.75 6.14 0.00 166.00    1.38 6.78 0.00 167.00 
Number of Citations per Patent (3 year citation lag) 0.08 0.37 0.00 7.00    0.14 0.47 0.00 12.00 
Number of Citations per Patent (5 year citation lag) 0.15 0.59 0.00 7.00    0.28 0.89 0.00 17.00 
Number of Claims US 1.65 4.91 0.00 83.00    2.82 5.75 0.00 67.78 
Number of Claims Europe 1.33 3.82 0.00 39.00    2.36 4.89 0.00 83.85 
Family Size 0.67 2.06 0.00 25.64    1.22 2.64 0.00 28.00 
                        
             
After the UAS 
establishment 
Number of Patent Applications 3.17 25.78 0.00 556.00    14.41 171.05 0.00 6750.17 
Number of Granted Patents 1.00 10.12 0.00 277.00    2.43 13.33 0.00 407.00 
Number of Citations per Patent (3 year citation lag) 0.11 0.73 0.00 30.00    0.21 0.61 0.00 10.79 
Number of Citations per Patent (5 year citation lag) 0.21 0.97 0.00 31.00    0.41 1.09 0.00 19.81 
Number of Claims US 1.86 5.60 0.00 171.00    3.51 6.74 0.00 83.00 
Number of Claims Europe 1.57 4.52 0.00 79.98    3.02 5.82 0.00 64.00 
Family Size 0.70 2.17 0.00 41.69    1.43 3.03 0.00 32.35 
                        
             
 
Number of Municipalities 392    1043 
       
      
Source: EPO Worldwide Patent Statistical Database – April 2013 Version.  
	  
																																								 																				
20 Descriptive statistics show averages per municipality (not per applicant). The share of municipalities having at least one patent in the control group equals 
17.95% before and 18.62% after the establishment of UASs; the share in the treatment group equals 30.12% before and 31.89% after the establishment. The 
differences before and after the establishment and between the treatment and control groups, i.e. the DID effect, is positive and significant. 
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics for quantity and quality indicators – Trends 
    Untreated regions     Treated regions 
  
       
 
Variable 
Average trend 
in percent Std. Err.    
Average trend 
in percent Std. Err. 
Before the 
UAS 
establishment 
Number of Patent Applications 0.010*** (0.004)    0.014*** (0.003) 
Number of Granted Patents 0.009*** (0.003)    0.012*** (0.002) 
Number of Citations per Patent (3 year citation lag) 0.004*** (0.002)    0.005*** (0.001) 
Number of Citations per Patent (5 year citation lag) 0.007*** (0.002)    0.010*** (0.002) 
Number of Claims US 0.013** (0.006)    0.015*** (0.004) 
Number of Claims Europe 0.011** (0.005)    0.014*** (0.004) 
Family Size 0.005 (0.004)    0.008*** (0.003)    
                
  
       
After the UAS 
establishment 
Number of Patent Applications 0.000 (0.003)    0.010*** (0.002) 
Number of Granted Patents -0.002 (0.002)    0.002 (0.002) 
Number of Citations per Patent (3 year citation lag) 0.001 (0.001)    0.003*** (0.001) 
Number of Citations per Patent (5 year citation lag) 0.001 (0.002)    0.004*** (0.001) 
Number of Claims US -0.009** (0.004)    -0.005* (0.003) 
Number of Claims Europe -0.006* (0.003)    -0.004 (0.003) 
Family Size -0.005**  (0.002)      -0.005**  (0.002)    
                
  
       
 
Number of Municipalities 392    1043 
  
       
Source: EPO Worldwide Patent Statistical Database – April 2013 Version. Given that the distribution of the outcome variables is skewed to the right, we 
transform the outcome variables to receive approximate normal distributions. A regression of the variable ln(number of patents) and of the variables 
indicating patent quality on the continuous year variable (1990 to 1997 for the period before the reform and 1998 to 2008 for the period after the reform) 
provides the average changes in the outcome variable for the treatment and the control groups and for the period before and after the reform. The trends 
of the treatment and the control groups before the reform do not show a statistically significant difference. 
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IV. Empirical Framework 
A. Difference-in-Differences Estimation 
To analyze the effect of the establishment of UASs on regional patenting quantity and quality, 
we use a DiD21 approach and estimate the following equation: 
 
 (1)  ! =  ! +  !!"#$%&#'%!" +  !! +  !!"! +  !! +  !!" 
 
Our dependent variable Y includes our set of indicators for patent quantity and quality in 
municipality j in year t+3. The variable ln(Number of patentsjt+3), our quantitative measure, 
refers to the natural logarithm22 of the number of patent applications three years after the 
establishment of a UAS campus (t+3) in municipality j. We use a time lag of three years because 
we assume that UAS have no immediate impact on innovation, given that potential channels for 
innovation take time to evolve. 23  
																																								 																				
21 The DiD technique is particularly appropriate for measuring changes in patent quantity and quality, for two 
reasons. First, finding a correct and meaningful benchmark, a problem usually found in studies analyzing effects on 
patent indicators, is not an issue in our study (Squicciarini et al., 2013; OECD, 2009). The DiD approach estimates 
changes in patent quantity and quality in the treatment group relative to the control group. As the results show 
changes relative to the control group, the interpretation is therefore straightforward. Second, estimating changes in 
patent indicators over time might lead to biased results: Factors unrelated to inventive or economic characteristics 
(e.g., changes in patent legislation or changes in the measurement technique of the indicators) might lead to 
misleading estimation outcomes. However, as these factors equally affect both the treatment and control groups, they 
do not distort our results. 
22 To transform the variable Number of patents, we add 1 to all patent counts.  
23 Such direct and indirect channels could be, e.g., UAS graduates or joint research projects between UAS’s and 
firms. Acquiring a Bachelor’s degree at a UAS takes three years, and establishing research cooperation and finishing 
a typical project generally takes at least three years. Although many of the processes may take longer and innovation 
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Our measures of innovation qualitaty include  
- the number of granted patents ln(Grantedjt+3),  
- the citations each patent receives within three years and within five years24 ln(Citations per 
patentjt+3) 
- the number of claims, ln(Claims USjt+3), and in the latest EP publication, ln(Claims EPjt+3) 
- the number of jurisdictions in which an invention is protected (international patent family), 
ln(Family sizejt+3) 
The explanatory variables on the right-hand side of  (1 include the variable TGj, a dummy that 
indicates whether a municipality belongs to the treatment group. TGj equals one when a 
municipality j is located within a 25 km radius to a UAS campus. The term γ represents the 
common non-linear time trend of the treatment and the control groups and includes year 
dummies. To control for unobservable time-constant effects on the district level, we include the 
variable λk, which comprises district dummies.25 εjt is the error term. 
Our main variable of interest, Treatmentjt, is a dummy variable indicating whether 
municipality j has a UAS campus in year t. The coefficient β in the equations shows the effect of 
UAS establishment on a region’s patenting activity, assuming that the treated regions would have 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																				
effects may become stronger over time, we use short time lag (three years) to make our test stronger and 
underestimate the effect size. 
24 For those patent applications having no citations, we add a constant of 1 before transforming into ln(Citations 
per patentjt+3) 
25 We control for districts because they could potentially affect the results as follows: Although unrelated to UAS 
establishment, the economic background of a region (e.g., industry structure or tax regime) may have an effect on 
our innovation outcomes. To control for differences in economic background even in the absence of a full set of 
observable or unobservable characteristics, we include dummy variables for all districts. 
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had the same trends as the untreated regions had the policy reform not happened. We test this 
assumption (and others) in Section B. 
 
B. Identification 
The key assumption in estimating the effect of UAS in the difference-in-differences model is 
the parallel trends assumption: that treated regions (the treatment group) and untreated regions 
(the control group) have parallel trends in the absence of the UAS reform (e.g., Angrist & 
Pischke, 2008). Because our data contains information on multiple years before and after the 
creation of UAS, we can investigate this parallel trends assumption.  
Figure 2 shows the natural logarithm of the number of patents per municipality from 1990 
through 2008 for the treatment and the control groups. The curves show a common underlying 
trend before the establishment of the UAS campuses in 1997. After the establishment, a deviation 
from this common trend takes place.26 
	  
																																								 																				
26 Figures showing the trends for the qualitative indicators are available in Pfister (mimeo 2017) 
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Figure 2 ln(Number of Patents) for treatment and control group, before and after the UAS 
establishment 
 
Source: EPO Worldwide Patent Statistical Database – April 2013 Version; control group curve 
shifted to the initial level of treatment group curve. 
 
To test whether the trends of the treatment and the control groups were parallel before the 
UAS establishment or whether they show a statistically significant difference, we proceed as 
follows: We regress the quantitative and qualitative innovation indicators on the years 1990 to 
1997, the period preceding the UAS creation27, thereby differentiating between the pre-treatment 
trend for the control group (the variable Year) and the pre-treatment trend for the treatment group 
(the variable Year x TG). If the interaction Year x TG shows a statistically significant effect, the 
treatment group would have a significantly different trend from the control group. 
																																								 																				
27 The variable Treatment Group (TG) shows the difference in the log of the number of patents between the 
treatment and the control groups in 1990. 
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Table 4 shows the results with a linear time trend, and Table 5 shows the same results for 
possible non-linear trends by including dummies for each year. Both tables show no statistically 
significant difference in pre-treatment trends (variable Year x TG) between the treatment and 
control groups. Therefore, we find no indication of a violation of the parallel trends assumption.28  
The second key assumption of our empirical strategy concerns the mobility of graduates. To 
estimate the unbiased effect of UASs on regional patenting activities, we assume that UAS 
graduates have stable mobility and commuting behavior.29 However, although we showed that 90 
percent of employed individuals commute less than 25 kilometers to work, the remaining ten 
percent may commute from a non-treated area into a treated area and vice versa. In addition, 
graduates might still live in the catchment area in which they graduated, while commuting to a 
firm located in the non-treated region. Moreover, after finishing their studies, UAS graduates 
could move from a treated to a non-treated area and start working there. Such contamination of 
treatment and control groups could lead to biased results. Although such movement works 
against our hypothesis and thus makes our test stronger, we nevertheless provide a detailed 
analysis of the possible contamination effects in section VI, showing that these effects are very 
small and negligible. 
																																								 																				
28 One explanation for these parallel trends between the treatment and the control groups are the political 
environment and the multiple and coalition building processes surrounding the establishment of the different UAS 
campuses. 
29 The second form of direct spillovers (interaction between UASs and firms) and indirect spillovers are less 
prone to these mobility concerns, because UAS’s, firms and cities are less mobile than graduates are. 
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Table 4 Parallel trends assumption quantitative and qualitative Indicators – linear trend 
      Dependent Variable 
    
ln(Number of 
Patents) ln(Granted) 
ln(Citations, 3-
year lag) 
ln(Citations, 5-
year lag) ln(Claims US) ln(Claims EP) ln(Family Size) 
   
      
Year 
 
0.0101*** 0.0090*** 0.0044*** 0.0071*** 0.0128** 0.0113** 0.0054    
  
(0.0039) (0.0027) (0.0015) (0.0021) (0.0057) (0.0054) (0.0037)    
Year x Treatment Group 0.0035 0.0034 0.0009 0.0027 0.0018 0.0026 0.0025    
  
(0.0049) (0.0036) (0.0018) (0.0026) (0.0070) (0.0066) (0.0046)    
Treatment Group 0.2396*** 0.1519*** 0.0362*** 0.0593*** 0.2566*** 0.2385*** 0.1825*** 
  
(0.0462) (0.0303) (0.0078) (0.0119) (0.0451) (0.0421) (0.0322)    
  
       
Constant 
 
0.2606*** 0.1453*** 0.0340*** 0.0615*** 0.3126*** 0.2890*** 0.2226*** 
  
(0.0350) (0.0231) (0.0056) (0.0088) (0.0357) (0.0333) (0.0253)    
AR2 
 
0.0131 0.0129 0.0080 0.0115 0.0142 0.0145 0.0151    
R2 
 
0.0134 0.0131 0.0083 0.0118 0.0144 0.0147 0.0153    
n 
 
11480 11480 11480 11480 11480 11480 11480    
p-Value   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Source: EPO Worldwide Patent Statistical Database – April 2013 Version. Clustered Standard errors on the municipality level are reported in parentheses; * 
statistically significant at the 0.1 level; ** at the 0.05 level; *** at the 0.01 level.  
	  
	25 
Table 5 Parallel trends assumption quantitative and qualitative indicators – year dummies 
    Dependent Variable 
    
ln(Number of 
Patents) ln(Granted) 
ln(Citations, 3-
year lag) 
ln(Citations, 5-
year lag) ln(Claims US) ln(Claims EP) ln(Family Size) 
  
       
Year 
 
       
 
1990 Base Group Base Group Base Group Base Group Base Group Base Group Base Group 
  
       
 
1991 -0.0185 -0.0216 0.0014 -0.0033 -0.0128 -0.0240 -0.0194    
  
(0.0225) (0.0170) (0.0083) (0.0117) (0.0368) (0.0344) (0.0235)    
 
1992 0.0026 0.0003 0.0158 0.0158 -0.0235 -0.0209 -0.0064    
  
(0.0250) (0.0191) (0.0101) (0.0136) (0.0386) (0.0366) (0.0264)    
 
1993 0.0421 0.0282 0.0259** 0.0425*** 0.0360 0.0246 0.0418    
  
(0.0290) (0.0192) (0.0124) (0.0160) (0.0423) (0.0389) (0.0288)    
 
1994 0.0691** 0.0536** 0.0186* 0.0316** 0.0793 0.0556 0.0460    
  
(0.0323) (0.0235) (0.0112) (0.0152) (0.0487) (0.0442) (0.0316)    
 
1995 0.0461* 0.0397** 0.0199** 0.0342** 0.0710 0.0596 0.0493*   
  
(0.0271) (0.0189) (0.0100) (0.0144) (0.0441) (0.0409) (0.0289)    
 
1996 0.0403 0.0347* 0.0305*** 0.0546*** 0.0393 0.0263 0.0171    
  
(0.0290) (0.0200) (0.0110) (0.0163) (0.0424) (0.0393) (0.0296)    
 
1997 0.0569* 0.0477** 0.0311*** 0.0379** 0.0692 0.0611 0.0145    
  
(0.0315) (0.0229) (0.0118) (0.0160) (0.0470) (0.0451) (0.0295)    
  
       
Year x Treatment Group        
 
1990 Base Group Base Group Base Group Base Group Base Group Base Group Base Group 
  
       
 
1991 0.0092 0.0174 -0.0061 -0.0043 0.0134 0.0259 0.0271    
  
(0.0292) (0.0222) (0.0111) (0.0157) (0.0463) (0.0433) (0.0311)    
 
1992 0.0060 0.0128 -0.0153 -0.0124 0.0447 0.0440 0.0048    
  
(0.0318) (0.0240) (0.0130) (0.0174) (0.0494) (0.0462) (0.0341)    
 
1993 0.0319 0.0375 -0.0127 -0.0100 0.0411 0.0541 -0.0099    
  
(0.0355) (0.0250) (0.0153) (0.0203) (0.0527) (0.0486) (0.0360)    
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1994 0.0039 0.0169 0.0007 0.0020 -0.0175 0.0095 -0.0079    
  
(0.0388) (0.0289) (0.0145) (0.0195) (0.0587) (0.0534) (0.0388)    
 
1995 0.0287 0.0331 -0.0001 0.0168 0.0102 0.0236 0.0051    
  
(0.0351) (0.0256) (0.0136) (0.0198) (0.0552) (0.0512) (0.0371)    
 
1996 0.0189 0.0179 -0.0124 -0.0166 0.0163 0.0303 -0.0011    
  
(0.0369) (0.0266) (0.0137) (0.0201) (0.0535) (0.0495) (0.0373)    
 
1997 0.0289 0.0346 0.0069 0.0274 0.0424 0.0437 0.0502    
  
(0.0391) (0.0291) (0.0152) (0.0204) (0.0580) (0.0552) (0.0376)    
  
       
Treatment Group 0.2358*** 0.1425*** 0.0443*** 0.0685*** 0.2440*** 0.2189*** 0.1828*** 
  
(0.0499) (0.0328) (0.0099) (0.0146) (0.0521) (0.0490) (0.0369)    
  
       
Constant 
 
0.2662*** 0.1541*** 0.0314*** 0.0598*** 0.3249*** 0.3059*** 0.2237*** 
  
(0.0383) (0.0255) (0.0070) (0.0107) (0.0414) (0.0391) (0.0289)    
AR2 
 
0.0124 0.0124 0.0074 0.0112 0.0135 0.0138 0.0146    
R2 
 
0.0137 0.0137 0.0087 0.0125 0.0148 0.0151 0.0159    
N 
 
11480 11480 11480 11480 11480 11480 11480    
p-Value   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000    
Source: EPO Worldwide Patent Statistical Database – April 2013 Version. Clustered Standard errors on the municipality level are reported in parentheses; * 
statistically significant at the 0.1 level; ** at the 0.05 level; *** at the 0.01 level. Results of the joint F-test for the interaction between the year dummies and the 
variable TG equal 0.9393 for ln(Number of Patents), 0.7508 for ln(Granted), 0.6693 for ln(Citations, 3-year lag), 0.2281 for ln(Citations, 5-year lag), 0.9096 for 
ln(Claims US), 0.9522 for ln(Claims EP), and 0.7353 for ln(Family Size) (Prob. > F).  
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V. Results 
To estimate the effect of UAS on regional patenting activity, we estimate  (1) using a DiD 
estimator. Table 6 shows the results of the estimations using the our quantity and quality 
indicators: The first column displays the results for the number of patent applications. The 
Treatmentjt coefficient equals 12.23 (13 percent) and is statistically significant at the one percent 
level. The UAS establishment thus led to a significant and economically important increase in 
innovation quantity. 
The second column shows the results for our first quality indicator, the number of granted 
patents per municipality. This quality indicator tells us whether quality of patent applications in 
terms of the patentability criteria—inventive step, novelty, and industrial applicability—changes 
after the establishment of UASs. The coefficient of the variable Treatmentjt equals 7.5 and is 
statistically significant at the one percent level. In other words, the number of granted patent 
applications increases by 7.8 percent more in municipalities located in treated areas than those 
municipalities located in untreated areas. This increase in the number granted patents thus 
parallels the increase in the number of patent applications.30 The establishment of UAS therefore 
does not lead to an increase in the number of patent applications that are low quality and thus 
never lead to patents. In contrast, the increase in innovation quantity is also an increase in 
innovation quality. 
The third and the fourth columns of Table 6 show the results for our two forward citation 
indicators (the third column refers to the three-year citation lag; the fourth, to the five-year lag). 
While the variable for granted patents shows the absolute number of granted patent applications 
for each municipality, our forward citation indicators show the number of citations for each 
																																								 																				
30 The effect on the number of granted patents per patent applications, i.e., the change in ratio of granted patents 
relative to the number of patent applications, equals 0.4 percent and is statistically insignificant. 
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patent application. Together, these two indicators are relative quality measures showing the 
change in average citations for each patent application. The effect of UAS on forward citations 
with a three-year citation lag equals 1.3 percent; with a five-year lag, 3.0 percent. Both 
coefficients are statistically significant (at the ten and the one percent level).  
This effect in the two quality indicators has three implications. First, as forward citations 
reflect the importance of the patented technology for the patent holder, the establishment of 
UASs increased the private economic value of patents for their owners. Second, citations mirror 
the social value of an invention, i.e., its economic externalities: A large number of forward 
citations implies that the invention is important for those not holding the patent. UASs thus 
increased not only the private value of patents but also their social value. Third, an increase in the 
number of citations with a short citation lag implies that the invention is rapidly recognized. The 
positive effect in the number of citations with a three-year lag thus show that UAS increase the 
technological value of patents.  
The fifth and sixth columns show that the number of claims increased in both the U.S. and 
Europe. These two indicators show the boundaries of the property rights that the patent protects. 
More claims, i.e., the broader the scope of a patent, imply a broader legally protected 
technological area and, consequently, higher economic value for the patent holder. In our DiD 
framework, the coefficient of the variable Treatmentjt shows the percentage change in the number 
of claims in patents in the treatment group compared to that in the control group. The two 
indicators thus measure whether the average scope of a patent—and its economic value—in the 
treatment group increased more than that of patents in the control group. For the U.S., the effect 
amounts to 10.6 percent; for Europe, 9.3 percent. The average number of claims per patent thus 
increased by almost 11 percent in the U.S., and by 9 percent in Europe. These results demonstrate 
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that the establishment of UASs led to a significant increase in the average patent scope and, 
consequently, to an increase in the average economic value of the patents. 
The seventh column shows the change in the average patent family size, i.e., the number of 
countries in which a patent is protected. Given that filing and enforcing an invention in different 
jurisdictions is costly, only patents of high expected value have protection in several countries. In 
regions that received a UAS, the average patent family size increased by 6.8 percent more than in 
non-UAS regions. Thus patents in treated regions are protected in 6.8 percent more countries than 
those in untreated regions, corroborating the increase in the economic value of patents due to the 
establishment of UAS. 
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Table 6 OLS Results for Patent Quantity and Quality 
  
Dependent Variable 
    
ln(Number of 
Patents) ln(Granted) 
ln(Citations, 3-
year lag) 
ln(Citations, 5-
year lag) ln(Claims US) ln(Claims EP) ln(Family Size) 
  
       
Year yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
  
       
TGj 0.072 0.012 0.016 0.026 0.025 0.030 0.016    
  
(0.071) (0.048) (0.014) (0.022) (0.064) (0.061) (0.046)    
  
       
Treatmentjt 0.122*** 0.075*** 0.013* 0.030*** 0.101*** 0.089*** 0.065*** 
  
(0.027) (0.019) (0.008) (0.010) (0.026) (0.025) (0.018)    
  
       
Constant 0.451*** 0.304*** 0.069*** 0.126*** 0.550*** 0.507*** 0.379*** 
  
(0.055) (0.038) (0.012) (0.018) (0.053) (0.0496) (0.037)    
  
       
AR2 0.251 0.205 0.109 0.136 0.171 0.172 0.188    
R2 0.255 0.209 0.114 0.141 0.175 0.177 0.192    
N 
 
22960 22960 22960 22960 22960 22960 22960 
p-Value  0.000 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
Source: EPO Worldwide Patent Statistical Database – April 2013 Version. Clustered Standard errors at the municipality level are reported in parentheses; * 
statistically significant at the 0.1 level; ** at the 0.05 level; *** at the 0.01 level.  
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VI. Robustness Checks 
In our robustness checks, we first tackle the potential bias arising from contamination of the 
treatment and the control groups focusing on three forms of mobility of UAS graduates.  
The first possible cause of contamination is UAS graduates’ commuting behavior across the 
regional boundaries that we previously defined.31 To reduce this potential contamination, we 
redefine our catchment areas and exclude a belt of municipalities located just at the boundaries of 
our treatment regions. In other words, we exclude the outer limits of our original area from the 
analysis, because those are the areas where the treatment and control groups could most likely be 
contaminated in both directions.  
The first column in Table 7 shows the results of the DiD regression of  (1 with the reduced 
sample. The coefficient of Treatmentjt is slightly, but not significantly higher than that in the 
baseline model (0.132 (0.028) vs. 0.122 (0.027)). As the increase in the coefficient is very small, 
the contamination of the baseline model appears only marginal. 
The second form of mobility that may cause contamination is UAS graduates not commuting 
but instead moving across the regional boundaries. To analyze the moving behavior of UAS 
graduates, we use a representative survey for Switzerland, the Survey of Higher Education 
Graduates (EHA), provided by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. This survey shows that five 
years after graduation, about 75 percent of UAS graduates from engineering, IT, chemistry, and 
the life sciences still live in the same UAS catchment area in which they graduated. Thus moving 
across the boundaries of our regions is a restricted problem. 
The third form of mobility that may cause contamination is graduates commuting to another 
catchment area than the one they graduated in. As an indicator of the extent of this form of 
																																								 																				
31 Pfister (mimeo 2017) provides an extensive description of the data and the methods for analyzing potential 
contamination effects. 
	32 
contamination, we take the net fluctuations between the catchment areas for the following 
reasons: If graduates from a UAS catchment area start working in a control group area, our 
estimation results would be downwardly biased; conversely, if graduates are evenly distributed 
across the areas, i.e., if the net fluctuations between the different UAS catchment areas are low, 
contamination is low and our results would be only marginally affected.32 For 80 percent of the 
UAS catchment areas, the net fluctuations equal at most one percentage point, meaning that 
incoming and outgoing UAS graduates cancel one another out across treated regions. Even in the 
regions with the largest net fluctuation, the problem remains insignificant because the great 
majority of the graduates are distributed evenly across the regions. 
Although all forms of mobility—commuting or moving—might lead to contamination of the 
treatment and control groups, these issues cause only very limited problems in our Swiss data. 
Therefore, studying this policy reform in Switzerland provides an almost ideal setting for 
analyzing the causal effects of applied research on innovation. However, even if mobility were an 
empirical concern, the resulting contamination effect would lower the effect sizes and potential 
significance—and therefore make our test stronger—and the true effect size is likely to be even 
higher. 
Second, we focus on the economic background of the smallest regional entities municipalities, 
including municipality fixed effects, in our baseline estimation equation. By so doing, we are able 
to control for unobservable time-constant characteristics at the lowest possible level.33 Column 
two of Table 7 displays the results of the estimation. As the coefficient β shows a lower effect 
than the baseline model, the municipality fixed effects erode part of the innovation effect. Given 
that they control for unobservable time-constant characteristics at a much lower level than the 
																																								 																				
32 The results would imply a downward bias. 
33 See Pfister (mimeo 2017, chapter 2.6.2). 
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district fixed effects, this decrease in the innovation effect is in line with our expectations.34 
However, the effect still equals 7.7 percent and is statistically significant at the one percent level. 
The effect, though smaller, remains robust to the inclusion of municipality fixed effects. Our 
result indicate that it is not induced by the municipalities’ underlying unobservable time-constant 
characteristics. 
Third, we deal with the question of whether the expansion of higher academic education could 
also potentially drive our results.35 In 1990, for example, 86,000 students were enrolled in an 
academic university; by 2008, the number had increased to 120,000.36 This expansion of 
academic graduates constitutes a change in the labor supply, a change that may also substantially 
affect innovation in our regions. To compare the importance of the two different supply changes 
of highly skilled workers—the increase in UAS graduates due to the establishment of UASs and 
the increase in academic university graduates—we use data from the “Schweizer 
Hochschulinformationssystem” (SHIS), provided by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. In other 
words, we model the change in the labor supply of UAS graduates and of academic university 
graduates in each municipality and in each year to investigate their relative importance for 
regional patenting activity.  
Column three of Table 7 includes the variables for two supply changes. It shows a large and 
statistically significant effect for the UAS graduates; the effect for the academic university 
																																								 																				
34 Switzerland consists of approximately 2,300 municipalities and 148 districts (see  
http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/regionen/11/geo/institutionelle_gliederungen/01b.html). 
35 Chapter 2.6.4 Confounding Effects: Education Expansion of Academic Universities provides an extensive 
description of the data and the methods to analyze the potential impact of a change in the supply of academic 
university graduates (Pfister, mimeo 2017). 
36 See SFSO, SHIS, at  
http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/infothek/erhebungen__quellen/blank/blank/sash/01.html. 
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graduates is six times smaller and insignificant. The coefficient of the variable Treatmentjt 
decreases substantially compared to the same coefficient in the baseline specification. This 
portion of the innovation effect is attributable to UAS graduates entering the labor market, 
remaining in it, and enhancing its quality. The remaining innovation effect relates to the other 
forms of spillovers—collaboration between UAS and firms, and agglomeration economies—or 
merely UAS professors producing patents. 
Fourth, we examine timing issues.37 As the baseline model shows only the average effect of 
the establishment of UAS on innovation over the entire observation period, we now investigate 
how the effect develops over years, i.e., in the first, second, third, and further years after UAS 
establishment. Column four of Table 7 shows the innovation effect from the third to the eleventh 
year after UAS establishment.38 The effect equals 4 percent in t+3 and increases to more than 13 
percent in later years. Thus the results clearly show that, first, the innovation effect takes time to 
manifest after the establishment of UAS; a time lag of three years therefore seems adequate to 
estimate the effect of the UAS on innovation in our baseline model. Second, the results show that 
the innovation effect increases over time. 
																																								 																				
37 See Pfister (mimeo 2017)for  a detailed description on the method to analyze how the innovation effect 
develops in post-treatment year. 
38 In addition, we find no statistically significant effect in the periods preceding UAS establishment. A positive 
effect in this period, particularly in the years close to t=0, would indicate that the assignment of the treatment was 
endogenous (e.g., Angrist & Pischke, 2008). In other words, an increase in patenting activities before the reform 
would indicate that the location and timing of the establishment of UAS campuses were related to innovative, 
technical, or economic factors. However, as expected, we find no effects for these years in the pretreatment period. 
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Fifth, we investigate whether rural areas profit from the establishment of UASs.39 The 
literature shows vast empirical evidence that rural areas have less highly educated workers, 
weaker economic growth rates, higher poverty, and lower innovative performance (e.g., Abel et 
al., 2014; Partridge, Rickman, Ali, & Olfert, 2009; Partridge & Rickman, 2008; Usai, 2011). To 
test whether the establishment of UASs had a positive effect on the regional patenting activities 
of rural areas, we restrict our sample to rural municipalities and estimate our basic estimation 
equation. Column five of Table 7 shows an effect of 4.7, i.e., 4.8 percent, which is statistically 
significant at the five percent level. Thus, compared to rural municipalities not located near a 
UAS campus, rural municipalities near a UAS campus show a 5 percent increase in patenting 
activities, i.e., a smaller than average effect. The UAS establishment thus had a positive effect on 
rural areas and improved their innovative performance.40 
 
																																								 																				
39 Chapter 4.3 The Effect of UAS on Rural Areas contains a detailed analysis of the impact of the establishment 
of UAS’s on rural municipalities (Pfister mimeo 2017). 
40 Estimating the effect of UAS on agglomeration municipalities reveals an 18 percent increase in patenting 
activities. Although comparing the effect of UAS on agglomeration municipalities with the effect on rural 
municipalities can lead to misleading conclusions (because the results of the two estimations are based on different 
subsamples), the differing sizes of the effects indicate that rural municipalities profit less from the UAS 
establishment than do agglomeration municipalities. 
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Table 7 OLS Results – Robustness Checks 
  Dependent Variable: ln(Number of Patents)     Contamination Analysis Municipality Fixed Effects Academic Education Expansion Innovation Effect over Time Rural Areas 
Year yes yes yes yes yes 
TGj 0.125 excluded 0.085    excluded 0.085*** 
  (0.089)  (0.068)      (0.020)            Treatmentjt 0.132*** 0.074*** 0.064**  t+1 0.035    0.047**  
  (0.028) (0.012)    (0.030)     (0.027)    (0.018)    UAS Graduates   0.033*** t+2 0.023     
    (0.008)     
(0.028)     University Graduates   0.005    t+3 0.039     
    (0.015)     (0.028)     
     t+4 0.048     
      (0.030)     
     t+5 0.065**   
      (0.030)     
     t+6 0.119***  
      (0.031)     
     t+7 0.126***  
      (0.032)     
     t+8 0.101***  
      (0.032)     
     t+9 0.095***  
      (0.034)     
     t+10 0.083**   
      (0.036)     
     t+11 0.056     
      (0.040)     Constant  0.435*** 0.503*** 0.441*** 0.495*** 0.185*** 
  (0.060) (0.015)    (0.053)    (0.026)    (0.032)    AR2 0.253 0.802    0.308    0.784    0.169    
R2 0.258 0.814    0.312    0.796    0.175    
N  17744 22960 22960    23902    14320 p-Value 0.000 0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    
Notes: Authors’ calculations, based on EPO Worldwide Patent Statistical Database – April 2013 Version. Clustered standard errors on the municipality level are 
reported in parentheses; the regression includes district fixed effects; * statistically significant at the 0.1 level; ** at the 0.05 level; *** at the 0.01 level.  
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VII. Conclusion 
Our study investigates the impact of Swiss Universities of Applied Sciences on regional 
innovation activities. These institutions were explicitly created and funded to conduct applied 
research and to train individuals with a vocational training degree. To study their effect on 
innovation, we exploit the staggered establishment of these UAS in the mid-1990s. To measure 
their impact on innovation, we employ a difference-in-differences approach and rely on patent 
data provided by the European Patent Office. As a quantitative measure of innovation activities, 
we use the number of patent applications. Our results show that the establishment of UAS led to 
an increase of approximately 7.7 to 13 percent in regional patenting activity. To estimate the 
effect on innovation quality, we use a set of quality indicators from the EPO database. All 
indicators show a positive and statistically significant effect. 
We provide extensive analyses of the key assumptions of the model, and our results strongly 
suggest that the increase in innovation quantity is indeed a causal effect of the establishment of 
UAS. First, we find no evidence for a violation of the first key assumption of the DiD model, the 
common trends assumption. Second, we find that the contamination of the treatment and control 
groups—the second key assumption of our model—affects our results only marginally, if at all, 
because (a) there is almost no net fluctuation in UAS graduates across our regions and (b) when 
we exclude a belt of municipalities at the outer border of our treated regions, the results become 
only stronger. Moreover, if contamination were a problem, the true effect would be even higher, 
because UAS graduates would raise the patent number in the control group instead of the 
treatment group, and our results would then underestimate the size of the effect. Thus we are 
confident that our results indeed measure the causal effect of the establishment of UAS on 
regional innovation activities.  
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The results of our other robustness tests show that differences between the regions 
(municipality fixed effects) do not change our results and that the effect is not driven by an 
overall educational expansion.  
The results of our robustness tests also provide insights into the potential mechanisms 
underlying this innovation effect. By modeling the innovation effect in each year following UAS 
establishment, we find that it develops over time. While the first two years show hardly any 
effect, from year three onward the effect becomes increasingly larger. This time pattern is in line 
with our theoretical expectations of direct spillovers: First, UAS graduates entering the labor 
market are bringing new knowledge to firms and help them boost innovation. Thus the effect 
should take hold several years after the establishment of a UAS, because that is when the first 
graduates enter the labor market, following which will be a steady stream of new graduates.  
Second, the establishment of UAS may affect patenting because of direct research cooperation 
between UAS professors or students with public or private firms in each respective region. 
Because establishing, funding, and carrying out R&D cooperation projects takes time (often at 
least three years because of application and funding processes), this second form of direct 
spillovers would also be consistent with an innovation effect taking hold after about three years.  
Furthermore, the results of our robustness tests provide some evidence for the relative 
importance of different mechanisms. They show that a considerable portion of the effect is 
related to UAS graduates entering the labor market. Future research should use employer data to 
investigate how firms adapt their personnel decisions to the newly created labor supply in the 
respective regions. The remaining innovation effect might be attributed to cooperation between 
UAS and firms, collaboration between UAS and other research institutes, or UAS professors 
producing patents. We plan to investigate the relevance of these mechanisms in future research. 
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Our analysis thus shows strong evidence that the establishment of UASs whose primary 
purpose is conducting and teaching applied research has a causal quantitative and qualitative 
effect on innovation activities in the regions where they have been established, even when these 
regions are outside major centers of commercial innovation. These properties should make UAS 
an interesting instrument of economic and regional policy. 
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